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1 Introduction 
The concept of ownership implies control. This is true for real objects as well as for abstract concepts like 
a bank account, copyright or digital data. The examples of owner's actions controlling their assets include 
transferring ownership to another party at will. However, in reality one's ability to control is somewhat 
limited due to a fundamental property of most things that can be owned - ownership can be lost against 
will. For example, cash can be lost as with other physical objects, a bank account can be locked, copyright 
may be lost due to a law suit, digital data can be unlawfully copied, effectively destroying its owner's 
control. 
 
There is a concept, however, which is substantially different from the above and that is authorship. 
Authorship cannot be taken away and it cannot be transferred. Table 1 summarizes these findings. 
 
While in some cases the loss of control may be a result of a legitimate decision, in others it may be the 
product of criminal actions and, as such, is highly undesirable. Over the years substantial resources have 
been devoted to developing solutions both for physical and electronic security. Digital data is particularly 
vulnerable due to the ease of copying. At the same time the importance of protecting such data is increasing 
as information technology plays a greater and more critical role in modern society. 
 
A natural solution to the digital data ownership problem is an electronic register that keeps track of 
records associating owners and their digital objects. In order to use such a register, owners must place trust 
in it which is not always desirable. Also, operational overheads often add costs to the use of such registers 
and this may limit their customer base. There is a long history of attempts to relax the requirement to trust 
a register and reduce the costs [1-6]. One of the latest breakthroughs in this area is a public ledger 
blockchain technology, originally implemented in Bitcoin cryptocurrency [7]. 
 
Two ownership properties shown in Table 1 follow a Yes-Yes pattern for usual objects and No-No for 
authorship. An object with a No-Yes pattern, however, would correspond to something that has the same 
intrinsic protection from being taken away (as with authorship), but with the ability to be transferred if its 
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owner wishes so. An object of this kind would have a multitude of applications since it would make practical 
use of the idea of ultimate protection. 
 
In the following section we present a scheme that allows one to control a digital object (Hasq token) as 
secure - as if the owner is the author of a publicly available artifact - and at the same time being able to 
transfer ownership to another untrusted party. 
 
 
Ownership property Real objects, 
money (cash) 
Money 
(bank account) 
Copyright Authorship Hasq token 
Can be lost against will Yes Yes Yes No No 
Can be transferred at will Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 
Table 1 
 
2 Hash Chain 
Suppose there is a publicly available textual database. One can think of a database as an equivalent of 
issues of a magazine or a newspaper. The database is built upon a particular hash function and consists of a 
list of records. Each record has the following textual fields separated by a space: 
 
{ } [ ]DOGGKSN ...21  
 
where 
N  is a sequence number for a particular S ; 
S  is a hash function representation of digital data of arbitrary nature, S  is expressed as a string of 
hexadecimal
1
 characters (token); 
K , G  and  O  are hash strings explained below; 
D  is an optional textual data field. 
 
The fields K , G  and  O  are used to link records. They stand for Key, Generator and Owner. A number of 
fields G  is arbitrary but fixed within a database. For the sake of simplicity we will consider only one field G ; 
however, zero or more than one can easily be assumed by a reader. A database is a mix of records 
containing different tokens S . If records with the same S  are selected, the list of records would look like 
the following (the field D  is left out here for simplicity since it does not participate in record linking): 
 
...
...
4444
3333
2222
1111
0000
OGKSN
OGKSN
OGKSN
OGKSN
OGKSN
 
 
Here ...,, 210 NNN  are consecutive numbers for the chosen S : ,1,1 1201 +=+= NNNN and so on. 
 
 
The records are chained with use of the following rules: 
                                                          
1
 Here we describe a particular selection of forms such as textual representation or concatenation charac-
ter. This is specified explicitly for ease of presentation; however, some generality is sacrificed. 
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Hash function takes arguments in a textual representation with arguments concatenated with the use of 
a space character. The result is also a textual representation in hexadecimal format. 
 
A server hosting the database publishes a new record only if it follows the above rules. Such a database is 
said to be consistent and its consistency can be verified independently. 
 
The following illustration is a graphical representation of the above rules. 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
User ownership is realized in the following way. Suppose that the last record the database contains for a 
particular S  is 0000 OGKSN . It is said that the user owns token S  when he knows the (secret) 
keys 1K  and 2K . These keys in turn can be generated by some algorithm from the user’s personal 
passphrase. For example, a simple key generation method could be: 
 
( )passphrase,,Hash SiK i =  
 
There are number of techniques to pass token ownership from one person to another. The most 
interesting scenario is when the recipient (who receives the token – the future owner) desires to stay 
absolutely anonymous
2
. The recipient generates 3K , 2G  and 1O , then sends 1O  to the current owner, let us 
call him the sender. The sender publishes a new record 1111 OGKSN  revealing his first secret key 
1K . After the publication the recipient can verify that 1O  appeared in the database. At this moment in time 
neither the sender nor the recipient owns the token S , because 2K  is known only to the sender and 3K  is 
known only to the recipient. Until the sender and the recipient come to an agreement, the token is locked. 
Next the recipient generates 2O  (by generating 4K  and 3G  first) and sends both 2G  and 2O  to the sender 
                                                          
2
 This distinguishes from Bitcoin’s pseudo-anonymity. Publication of records is based on messages holding 
records passed to a database keeping server. Generally servers do not require TCP or other real-time con-
nection with a client. 
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to publish the record 2222 OGKSN . Once this record is published, the recipient becomes the 
current owner of token S  because he knows both new secret keys 3K  and 4K . 
3 Technology and Applications 
Hasq Technology Pty Ltd has developed a working high performance distributed system which utilizes the 
above described scheme and has solved many issues accompanying the implementation. 
 
Hasq databases are shared between untrusting servers by a simple network protocol. The core of the 
protocol is a set of commands to get records and to add a new record. The servers are tuned to send 
notifications to other servers when they publish new records, but their work is independent and the 
databases are not required to be synchronized. 
  
Isolated failures of servers or connection issues do not affect the stability of the Hasq network as a whole 
since servers are designed to reconfigure themselves to maintain network integrity as much as possible. 
 
To accommodate different hardware requirements several types of servers are supported. Effective 
control of server database size is also possible via use of configuration parameters. 
 
It may be desirable in some cases to make databases incompatible. Different hash functions help achieve 
this. If the same hash function is used, special fixed publicly known strings added to all hash calculations 
make databases unique. 
 
The Hasq record chaining scheme allows manipulation of tokens with the following properties. The token 
can: 
 
• be passed electronically over the Internet or telephone 
• be passed fully anonymously for either the sender or the recipient 
• serve as a currency note 
• serve as an obligation 
• serve as a verifiable title for ownership 
• serve as modifiable association with a particular piece of electronic data 
 
If an organization issuing tokens sets up a group of non-anonymous users, the organization may use some 
tokens in the form of a debt, i.e. tokens representing negative values. This can be organized as follows. Each 
user owns an ID token representing their identity. User A having a particular predefined text (debt token), 
published in their data field, is assumed to owe something. Once another user B is willing to accept this debt 
from user A, user B publishes the debt token in the data field of their identity token. User A publishes a 
reference to the record where user B accepted the debt token, effectively releasing himself from the debt 
token. 
 
The above is a short example of many other applications [8] already known to the community. This list 
may grow over time considering current technologies are in their early stages. 
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